Prime

I’m sharing a list of write-ups that I have found helpful.

There’s an element of buyer-beware here. I don’t agree with everything these pieces say. As important, I don’t know every aspect of the background of the authors. But I’ve done enough research to have confidence they are reasonable, knowledgable people and the pieces are ones I have found helpful in making sense of what’s happening on the ground in Ukraine right now.

I wanted to share a few more thoughts on this fighter jet issue.

The WSJ reports tonight that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have both signaled to Washington that they won’t help ease the global squeeze on gasoline supplies and surging prices unless the Biden administration falls into line on Yemen and other regional issues — one of these being immunity for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the murder of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi. The specific hook of the article is that the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both declined calls from President Biden in recent weeks.

A few points that seem important to absorb — some of which may appear to be in tension.

I ALLUDED TO THIS in my earlier post on my list of military analysts. We’re seeing lots of imagery of downed plans, shattered tanks, captured tanks, often with detailed information about where and how they were destroyed. But that flood of information often leaves us — even if we don’t know it — unclear on the big picture. This thread notes that many of us are getting an incomplete view of the situation in Ukraine because Ukraine’s (and its supporters’) social media efforts have been so effective. The issue here isn’t deception or misinformation, though there’s certainly some of that. It’s that the supporters of Ukraine are doing a very effective job surfacing imagery every time the Ukrainian army scores a tactical victory — destroying a tank, shooting down a plane. And we’re seeing much less of the fact that Russia is continuing to make progress on the ground — just slowly. Maybe very slowly. But they are making progress.

The AP has a new story about how unforced errors are potentially getting in the way of the GOP’s path back to a Senate majority in 2022. Most of us are aware of the developments the piece is referring to. You can review them here. I don’t want to get too deeply into the ins and outs of how bad this is for the GOP, whether it’s enough of a problem to keep the Democrats in power. But we know that in general this is a very real dynamic. Democrats managed to hold on to the Senate in 2010 in what was otherwise a brutal midterm rout. It happened again in 2012 — even though Democrats had to defend a ton of marginal pickups from the 2006 cycle. The dynamic is clear cut enough that it’s worth asking whether this is really a matter of “unforced” errors or whether this is what politics is like when politicians run in non-gerrymandered districts (i.e., states).

Though it is generally out of view for those of us who don’t live in that world, the world’s militaries maintain a universe of think tanks and war colleges to study all aspects of war. Some of this work is conducted by men and women in uniform and hidden behind walls of classification and secrecy. But quite a lot of it, probably most, is done by civilian researchers and academics with a lot of it available to the public, if not widely read. Last week I mentioned following the Twitter feed of Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at one of the top national security think tanks funded and run on behalf of the U.S. Navy and Marine corps. But there’s a whole world of such researchers working either adjacent to or on behalf of various national militaries. You can read a lot of what they write and many are following developments in Ukraine with their Twitter feeds.

In a new article in Foreign Affairs, Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage explain how even if Russia loses its war in Ukraine, the international outlook that creates is a dark one. Far better than it winning. But still very dark. Looking to a post-Ukraine war world order, the authors write: “History has shown that it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order with a revanchist, humiliated power near its center, especially one of the size and weight of Russia.”

I spent the morning planning to write a version of this post when I saw a quote from Russia’s head of foreign intelligence that made me think there was perhaps more here than I’d even suspected. Sergei Naryshkin said today: “The masks are off. The West isn’t simply trying to close off Russia behind a new iron curtain. This is about an attempt to ruin our government — to ‘cancel’ it, as they now say in ‘tolerant’ liberal-fascist circles.”

Now, on its face this is more than a bit much. Russia is in the process of trying to erase another country from the map, in effect if not through formal annexation. That seems like the more relevant meaning of ‘canceling’ in this context. This is also a reminder of the confluence of discourses between the American revanchist right (Trumpism and its earlier monikers, essentially) and Russian state revisionism. One thing we are constantly and rightly reminded of in these moments is that people in other countries, Russia in this case, understand the world very differently than we do. And yet here they are using language that is in fact quite familiar. It doesn’t seem alien at all. There’s a rhetorical symbiosis between the two worlds. Some of this was driven by the 2015–16 Russian interference campaign. But at a deeper level that symbiosis was the foundation on which that interference campaign became possible. Just as the democratic civic world has some elements of a transnational common political language, the authoritarian, revisionist international does too.