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A number of you have asked me, where’s President Biden? Why aren’t we seeing him on TV? Note that he has a State of the Union address coming up which will provide an extremely high profile setting. But the real reason is almost certainly that the U.S. administration wants to have Europeans taking the most visible role announcing new sets of sanctions. I suspect they also want to avoid taking the bait of President Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. Reports suggest that — wisely and unsurprisingly — President Biden has chosen not to match Russia’s nuclear forces alert status. First, there’s no need to. Our strategic nuclear forces are already on plenty of alert to manage the unthinkable. There’s no need for that kind of tit for tat escalation. We also don’t need competing press availabilities.

With all this said, though, there’s clearly something more happening here than just allowing Europe to take the lead in announcing measures the U.S. was trying to persuade them to take. There’s also clearly a sea change, both in the willingness to contemplate crippling economic sanctions as well as to openly arm the Ukrainian army.

We have two big developments this morning. The first is that in a televised exchange with his top military leaders, President Putin ordered the country’s strategic nuclear forces on alert in response to Western sanctions and what he called “threatening statements” from leaders in Europe. That means as little and as much you think. It underscores that while the punishing sanctions unveiled yesterday are merited this is nevertheless a spectacularly dangerous international crisis. Not just dangerous in Ukraine but for the whole world. At the same time, Russia and Ukraine have agreed to hold peace talks near the border with Belarus. They are talks without preconditions.

One curious feature of social media is that we actually have lots of detailed and close up imagery and information about particular military engagements. But it remains hard, at least for me, to get a clear view of the overall picture of what is happening right now in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government has released a number of figures about alleged Russian combat fatalities, which are very high. But it’s hard to know what to make of those numbers. Combat armies have a notoriously hard time estimating their adversaries’ casualties and fatalities. And the Ukrainians, involved in an existential battle, have plenty of very understandable incentives to make those numbers high.

There must have been many moments over recent days when President Zelensky said to himself, “How the fuck did I get here?” As most of you know, Zelensky was a comedian and an actor. His presidency was kind of a lark. My memory my fail me here but I believe his big claim to fame was a show in which he played a fictional President of Ukraine. So his whole candidacy had a meta/absurdist tinge to it and likely was only possible in a country in which much of the population regards the political class as hopelessly corrupt. And yet Zelensky now finds himself in a position in which he will either preside over the dissolution of the independent Ukrainian state or, if things go very differently, probably be regarded as something like a founding father of it.

Through my writing over recent weeks I’ve tried to keep up a secondary focus on the decisions the U.S. made about the Soviet Union, Russia and NATO during the 1990s. I think this is only a secondary part of the story. But it’s a part. In those debates we hear about Russia’s security concerns about NATO enlargement. I think it’s important to be specific and clear about what these security concerns really amount to.

I’ve written relatively little over recent days on the unfolding Ukraine Crisis. It’s one of those stories that is not only moving quickly but in many ways speaks for itself. I recommend reading Josh Kovensky’s latest report on events. Josh worked in Ukraine as a journalist for two or three years before coming to TPM, so he brings an area knowledge and access to the language that we’re lucky to have. As I’ve mentioned a few times, I’ve been using this Twitter list to navigate the rush of events. I recommend it. I also shared some thoughts on what’s happening in the edition of the podcast that comes out today.

One of the assumptions in much Ukraine commentary is that a full scale Russian invasion of the country would be followed at some point by what would, over time, be a potentially ruinous insurgency. That seems probable. And I suspect it’s the key reason — much more than even the most extreme sanctions — why Russia has so far held back from such a move. Even apart from the bad history of Great Powers getting bogged down in occupations of hostile territory, the military reforms under President Putin, which have revived Russia’s conventional military power, have prioritized rapid strike capabilities over holding territory. Such a scenario would be a catastrophe for Ukraine but it would likely be pretty bad for Russia too.

But this article in Foreign Policy shows how easily this scenario could bleed into a confrontation between Russia and NATO, even though neither side would have any interest in it doing so.

There’s a flurry of commentary this morning arguing that new economic sanctions introduced by the EU, European states individually and perhaps soon the United States in response to yesterday’s events are too weak and show NATO and the EU are somehow going soft. I’d suggest some skepticism with these arguments and a bit more patience. History doesn’t have many one and done moments. Thinking every moment is Munich and Neville Chamberlain mostly makes people dumb. The U.S./EU/NATO powers here need to find a balance between having a response to yesterday’s events while yet keeping some deterrent in reserve for further escalation.

A number of dangerous, disquieting and scary things happened today in the unfolding Ukraine Crisis. Russia is a revisionist, nuclear power. In today’s lengthy and bellicose speech, Vladimir Putin barely mentioned NATO. He focused on his long-attested belief that Ukraine is not a real country and is only separated from Moscow by historical accident and perfidy. Beyond wanting to bring Ukraine to heel he made broad and menacing statements that brought the whole post-Cold War settlement into question.

Scary stuff.

Here are a few possibilities to consider as Russian troops roll into eastern Ukraine.

Russia has shown in various ways in recent weeks that it fears the repercussions of a full scale invasion of Ukraine. Over the last couple weeks, Russia has been hung up on a binary choice: invade or begin a humiliating climbdown. This may be a way to create a third option: occupy and de facto annex the regions that have been under de facto Russian control for eight years, celebrate a great nationalist victory and wrap this crisis up. Declare victory and go home without the huge gamble of full scale invasion.